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Abstract
This paper studies strategic incentives to invest in electricity generation
capacity using a local fuel like renewables or coal. It shows that investing in
this capacity, even if not used, improves the bargaining position of a power
producing ﬁrm that also imports another fuel such as gas. When several im-
porters are considered, the paper ﬁnds that investment has a positive strategic
eﬀect on all other importers’ bargaining position. A government energy pol-
icy that forces utilities to invest in capacity based on particular fuels can be
justiﬁed not only for environmental but also for strategic reasons.
JEL classiﬁcation: C78, Q40, Q48, Q50.
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11 Introduction
Current energy discussions frequently relate to climate change and the increasing
import dependence on oil and gas. Net total gas imports of the European Union (EU-
27) amount to 60 percent of total EU consumption and supply is highly concentrated:
Russia is the largest supplier to the European Union with a share of 40 percent of
total imports, followed by Norway (23 percent) and Algeria (17 percent).1 Import
dependence is expected to grow in the coming years and the establishment of the
Gas Exporting Countries Forum may be the precursor of a future „Gas OPEC”. „The
Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) is a gathering of the world’s leading gas
producers aimed at representing and promoting their mutual interests.” Furthermore,
one of its missions is to „identify and promote measures and processes necessary to
ensure that Member Countries derive the most value from their gas resources, taking
into consideration the nature of gas as a non-renewable source of energy.”2
In this context, the European Union sets ambitious targets to transform Europe
into a low carbon economy with secure energy supplies. By the year 2020, not only
a reduction of at least 20 percent in greenhouse gas emissions, but also a share
of 20 percent of renewable energy source (RES) in EU energy consumption should
be achieved (European Commission, 2008). This shows that the European Union’s
energy policy objective, besides more competitive energy markets, is both to slow
down global warming and to protect the economy from excessive fuel import prices.
High fuel prices may be the result of a major supply disruption for geopolitical
or technical reasons, or of a concentrated supply favouring the exercise of market
power. By increasing the share of renewables in energy consumption, the EU strives
to minimize the economic impact of import price increases.
In this paper, we question whether it makes sense to foster renewable energy
sources not only for environmental but also for strategic reasons. To simplify, we
ignore the risk of a supply interruption for geopolitical or technical reasons and only
consider the problem of a concentrated fuel supply. In this setting, it is argued
that the fuel importing industry (e.g. the electricity sector) is not unaware of its
import dependence but at the same time it also recognizes its ability to alter import
prices. The reason is that the electricity sector is currently dominated by a few
large companies such as E.ON, GDF Suez or EDF. Due to their size, these compa-
nies cannot be regarded as passive price takers in the gas market. On the contrary,
we argue that they actively bargain with fossil fuel exporters over the import price.
Investing in local electricity generation capacity (e.g. wind, nuclear and coal-ﬁred
1Eurostat, yearly statistics 2006, Statistical Books 2008 Edition.
2See website of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum: http://www.gecforum.org/
2capacity with suﬃciently diﬀerentiated sources of supply) is a way to improve the
importer’s bargaining position and to protect itself against excessive import prices.
When several importers bargain with the same exporter, we also show that a com-
mon energy policy, like the European target of 20 percent of RES, may make sense
in the presence of positive strategic spillover eﬀects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview
of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the players we consider in the model,
namely one exporter and one importer of a fossil fuel. In Section 4, we describe
the sequence of the game which is formalized in Section 5. Section 6 introduces
increasing marginal supply costs. In Section 7 we explain why public intervention
may be required. Section 8 extends the model to several importers and the last
section concludes.
2 Literature review
The topic of our paper is related to three strands of literature which are brieﬂy
discussed below.
A ﬁrst strand of literature considers the two-sided strategic interaction between
exporters and importers of a natural resource and discusses the need for public inter-
vention. Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992) derive dynamically consistent oil import
tariﬀs to capture part of the resource rent. Wirl and Dockner (1995), Tahvonen
(1996), Rubio and Escriche (2001) or Liski and Tahvonen (2004) add the stock ex-
ternality problem related to harmful emissions. In this case, a carbon tax has two
components: a Pigouvian component to take the externality into account, and a
trade-policy, or strategic, component to capture part of the resource rent.
Our paper is diﬀerent to this literature as we do not consider fuel import de-
mand to be passive. Instead, importing ﬁrms recognize their ability to inﬂuence
import prices and they bargain actively with fuel suppliers. Furthermore, we do not
consider the exhaustibility of the polluting resource and the stock dimension of the
environmental externality.
A second strand of literature is related to the hypothesis of Galbraith (1952)
according to which concentrated downstream markets can act as a counterbalance
to powerful upstream ﬁrms. This is known as „countervailing power”. Larger buy-
ers are able to obtain lower input prices and social welfare increases if the lower
input prices are passed on to consumers. This argument is often brought forward in
merger cases (Inderst and Schaﬀer, 2008). The related literature mainly discusses
the eﬀect of the number of retailers, the mode of competition in the downstream
3market and the size of the buyers on the countervailing power. In von Ungern-
Sternberg (1996), the strategic interaction is modelled as a two-stage game. In
the ﬁrst stage, the single producer bargains with every retailer separately over the
wholesale price. The outcome is the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. the equilibrium
wholesale price rises if the producer’s exogenuously given bargaining power increases
or if the his outside option improves. The latter improves when the number of retail-
ers increases. In the second stage, the retailers compete according to the Cournot
or the perfect competition assumptions. In the case of Cournot competition, von
Ungern-Sternberg (1996) shows that when the number of retailers decreases, the de-
crease of the wholesale price is always more than outweighed by an increased market
power in the retail market. The countervailing power hypothesis thus only holds if
competition between retailers is ﬁerce (perfect competition). Dobson and Waterson
(1997) discuss a two-stage complete information game in which an input supplier
ﬁrst bargains with diﬀerentiated retailers over a unit transfer price. Then retailers
engage in a price-setting competition. The authors show that the bargaining power
of the supplier decreases when the number of retailers shrinks, since he has fewer
alternatives in case an agreement with one of the retailers fails (the outside option
of the supplier is weaker). However, the total eﬀect on the supplier’s proﬁt depends
on a second eﬀect, namely the substituability of the retailers’ good. If these goods
are close substitutes, competition among retailers is ﬁerce and leads to a decrease
of the ﬁnal price and of the supplier’s proﬁt, but increases social welfare. Hence,
competition authorities should accept highly concentrated retail markets only if the
goods are close subsititutes. However, the supplier could be tempted to deal with
only one retailer to avoid this second eﬀect. While his share of the surplus would
be smaller, the surplus itself would be larger. Inderst and Wey (2007) discuss two
channels of buyer power. Larger buyers obtain a discount if the supplier is capacity
constrained or has strictly convex costs. In the ﬁrst case, a larger buyer causes a
more than proportional loss to the supplier when the negotiation breaks down. In
the second case, with strictly convex supply costs, a larger buyer negotiates over a
wider production interval, where average incremental costs are lower. In contrast to
the two previous papers, Inderst and Wey (2007) only focus on the buyer’s size since
buyers do not compete with each other in the downstream markets. These markets
are independent and a single ﬁrm operates in each of them. The size of a buyer is
deﬁned by the number of retailing ﬁrms it owns.
Our paper is diﬀerent to this literature in the sense that we consider neither
competition between buyers nor the size of the buyer, since we deal with only one
buyer and one market with a constant demand for electricity. Instead, the buyer
4can improve his outside option by investing in locally available or geographically
unconcentrated energy sources.
Finally, our paper is related to a third strand of literature which deals with opti-
mal portfolio theory and the real options approach applied to electricity generation
(see for instance Bar-Lev and Katz [1976], Awerbuch [2006], Wickart and Madlener
[2007] or Roques et al. [2008]). Electricity generation mixes are the result of a com-
parison of current and future expected costs and risks associated to the diﬀerent
technologies.
Our approach is diﬀerent as we assume away uncertainty. Instead, we do not
consider fuel costs as given exogenously but show that the choice of the generation
mix will aﬀect the price an importer has to pay for his fuel imports.
3 Players
We propose a simpliﬁed model of bilateral negotiation since the traditional market
interface model, which assumes that agents interact anonymously, is less appropriate
when the number of players is small. Two players are considered: a domestic elec-
tricity producer who imports an input, e.g. gas and a foreign supplier of this input.
We refer to the former as importer and to the latter as exporter. The importer sells
the generated electricity to consumers on his market. We assume that consumers
are price-takers and have an exogeneously given demand equal to Q. Furthermore,
consumers are willing to pay at most ¯ P for q ≤ Q and 0 for q > Q (see ﬁgure 1).
Later on, we will also consider a government as a strategic player which intervenes





Figure 1: The demand for electricity
53.1 The importer
Let the electricity generating company be a monopolist in the domestic market.
Assume that to produce electricity it can use two technologies: one using a fuel
that needs to be imported, denoted f („foreign”), and another using a fuel that
is either locally available or geographically unconcentrated, denoted l. The former
technology refers to gas technology and the latter technology can refer to diﬀerent
types of technology: renewable energy, coal but also nuclear. For the sake of clarity,
we call this technology throughout the paper the „local” technology. The amount
of electricity produced with the gas technology (resp. local technology) is given by
qf ≥ 0 (resp. ql ≥ 0), i.e. total production is q = qf + ql.
In order to produce with the local technology, the importer has to build new
capacities with a cost k per unit of capacity and per period. The variable production
cost of this technology equals r per period. It does not require any input from
the exporter and has an emission rate el per unit of electricity produced. Total
production with the local technology is limited by the installed capacity K: 0 ≤
ql ≤ K.
Let the importer have capacities based on the gas technology already installed,
so that capital costs are sunk. Furthermore, we assume that this technology has no
capacity limit. This simplifying assumption favours the gas technology with respect
to the local technology, as no investment in this technology is needed anymore. In
this sense, we underestimate the incentives to invest in local technology. We assume
that to produce one unit of power with the gas technology, one unit of the input has
to be imported. Emissions per unit of production equal ef.
3.2 The exporter
In our simpliﬁed model, we assume that there is only one exporter with the supply
cost function C(qf), which we specify in detail further.3 The supply cost includes
the extraction and the transportation cost.
4 A dynamic game
We begin by considering the interaction between the importer and the exporter,
without governement intervention. Therefore, the environmental damage implied by
emissions is not taken into consideration. The importer and the exporter negotiate
3The network-system, which is necessary to transport the resource to the importing country,
exists and has no capacity limit.
6the terms of a supply contract, which is assumed to be complete and non-linear.
The contractual terms are the transfer that the importer pays to the exporter and
the amount of gas supplied to the importer. Furthermore, we avoid problems of
uncertainty and asymetric information by assuming that information is complete.
The timing of the game is as follows: in the ﬁrst period, the importer has the
option to invest in local technology. This period is referred to as the investment
period. In the second period, which we name the bargaining period, the importer
and the exporter negotiate a supply contract. The game is solved backwards.
5 Formalization
We start by analyzing the game in the second period, when capacity K of the local
technology is ﬁxed. Total supply costs of the foreign resource C(qf) and environ-
mental damages D(E) are linear in the quantity of electricity produced with the gas
technology and in emissions: C(qf) = cqf and D(E) = γE = γ (efqf + elql). The
case with a convex supply cost function will be discussed later.
5.1 The bargaining period
We model the bargaining game in characteristic function form. Let N = {i,e} be
the set of players, the importer and the exporter, respectively, and ν a characteristic
function deﬁned on all subsets (coalitions) S ⊆ N. Since we have two players in our
model, two situations are to be considered: the importer and the exporter cooperate,
in which case S = N and is called the ”grand coalition”, or each player stays alone
such that S = {i} or S = {e}, which are called singletons. The value ν(S) is deﬁned
as the maximum payoﬀ which can be achieved by members of coalition S. The
worth of an empty set is zero (ν(∅)=0) and the value function is assumed to be
super-additive: ν(N) ≥ ν({i}) + ν({e}).
To solve the game and to ﬁnd how the players share the joint payoﬀ, we use
the „Shapley value” (Shapley, 1953). The Shapley value can be considered as the





(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n!
[ν (S) − ν (S \ h)]; h = i,e (1)
where s and n are the number of players in coalitions S and N, respectively.4
4The function φ is the unique function that simultaneously satisﬁes the axioms of anonymity or
symmetry (players that are identically treated by the value function ν get the same Shapley value),
7If the exporter decides not to cooperate, then his payoﬀ is zero. The importer,
however, has a positive stand-alone payoﬀ if he invests in local technology. Then,
he can produce (and sell) electricity and earn a positive proﬁt. However, his pro-
duction is limited by the capacity K installed in the investment period. Given our
assumption that electricity demand and ¯ P are ﬁxed, the importer sets the monopoly
electricity price P = ¯ P and the consumer surplus

¯ P − P

q is zero. We obtain the
following values of the characteristic function:








Equation (3) gives the stand-alone payoﬀ of the importer, which is

¯ P − r

K if
K < Q and

¯ P − r

Q if K ≥ Q. Note that this stand-alone payoﬀ increases for a
higher parameter K.
When players stay together, they maximize their joint payoﬀ so that the worth








We distinguish two cases (see Appendix):
Case 1: the gas technology has a higher variable cost and the capacity of the local










A larger capacity K relaxes the constraint in (4) and increases the joint payoﬀ.
Case 2: the local technology has a higher variable cost and is, therefore, not used
at all (c ≤ r). This result relies on our assumption of unconstrained supply and








eﬃciency (the sum of the Shapley values for all players equals the value of the grand coalition)
and additivity (when two independent games ν and σ are combined, their Shapley values are
added for each player). For a proof, see Shapley (1953). Although the Shapley value is a solution
concept originating from cooperative game theory, it can also arise as an equilibrium outcome in
noncooperative frameworks (see, for instance, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001). For a simple
interpretation of the Shapley value, see Rapoport (1970, p.106).
8The constraint in (4) is not binding and a higher parameter K has no impact on the
joint payoﬀ. However it always improves the stand-alone value as long as K < Q.
So far, we have determined the value function ν (S;K) for every coalition S ⊆ N.
We now compute the Shapley value for both players, as in (1), and interprete the







[ν({h};K) − ν(N \ h;K)]; h = i,e. (7)
Equation (7) indicates that the value of the grand coaliton ν (N;K) is divided be-
tween the importer and the exporter depending on their stand-alone payoﬀ ν({h};K).
In particular, the importer’s bargaining position is improved by a larger local tech-
nology capacity K. If the local technology has a lower variable cost (c > r), it
increases both the joint payoﬀ and the stand-alone payoﬀ. If the variable cost is
higher (c ≤ r), it only increases the stand-alone payoﬀ (see equations (3) and (4)).
Therefore, local capacity may be unused but not useless as it has a threatening role.
However, the importer has to balance this beneﬁt with the increased investment
cost. This is investigated below.
5.2 The investment period
The previous section showed that the importer gets a better bargaining position if
he invests in local technology. However, a better outside option is costly. These two
eﬀects have to be balanced in the investment stage. The importer’s investment K
in renewable energy technology diﬀers in the two cases we depicted in the previous
section.
Case 1: The local technology has a lower variable cost (c > r). The
importer knows that the capacity K is fully used.
The maximization problem is thus
max
K [φi (K) − kK] (8)
where the ﬁrst term is the importer’s share in the joint proﬁt as stated in (7) and
the second term gives the investment cost. Knowing the optimal production mix
5The Appendix provides all steps that are necessary to compute the values.



























The marginal eﬀect of investing in capacity equals






















¯ P − r

− k. (10)
As shown in (10), investing in an additional unit of local capacity has three
eﬀects: it increases the joint payoﬀ ν (N,K) by replacing expensive generation by
cheaper generation. For a given sharing, this additional payoﬀ is divided equally
among the players and every player thus gets (c − r)/2. The second eﬀect is that
the importer’s relative outside option ν ({i},K) − ν ({e}) improves by the amount

¯ P − r

, which increases the Shapley value of the importer by

¯ P − r

/2. In other
words, the importer not only increases the cake but also his share of the cake. These
two eﬀects are to be compared with the third eﬀect, that is the investment cost k
of an additonal unit of local capacity.
Since we assume a linear cost structure, these three eﬀects are constant and
we obtain a corner solution: if the local technology has a low cost, i.e. r + k <

¯ P + c

/2, then the importer invests in this technology such that all electricity is
produced with this technology: K∗ = Q and q∗
l = q = Q. In the other case, when
r + k ≥

¯ P + c

/2, nothing is invested in the local technology, i.e. q∗
f = q = Q.
Case 2: The gas technology has a lower variable cost (c ≤ r). The im-
porter knows that the local technology will not be used.
The maximization problem of the importer is the same as stated in (8). However,
in this second case the production mix (q∗
f,q∗
l ) is diﬀerent and given by (6). By


























and the marginal eﬀect of investing in renewable energy capacity is



















¯ P − r

− k.
Contrary to the previous case, investing in additional capacity only has two
eﬀects: it increases the importer’s share of the joint payoﬀ ν (N) by

¯ P − r

/2 and
it costs k per unit. However, the joint payoﬀ cannot be increased since the local
technology has the higher variable cost and will thus never be used. Therefore, the
size of the cake does not change but the importer can increase his share of it.
As in Case 1, we obtain corner solutions for investment: if the investment cost
of the local technology is suﬃciently low (r + 2k < ¯ P), then the importer invests a
maximum in this technology, although it will not be used: K∗ = Q and q∗
f = q = Q.
The local technology has a purely strategic use. In the other case (r + 2k ≥ ¯ P),
nothing is invested in the local technology (K∗ = 0).
5.3 Summing up
The linear case shows that there are only corner solutions. Either no investment
takes place or all the electricity demand can be satisﬁed with local capacity. The
actual electricity production „mix” can be diﬀerent: the local technology can be
fully used or not used at all.
The joint payoﬀ ν (N) is shared between the players according to the Shapley
values φe and φi. The joint payoﬀ equals the total revenue the importer receives in
the electricity market minus total costs: ν(N) = ¯ PQ − q∗
fc − q∗
l r. The contractual





that the importer pays to the exporter and
the amount of gas q∗
f supplied to the importer, follow from the discussion above.
Instead of considering the sharing of the surplus according to the Shapley values
φh, it is useful to analyze the results in terms of the implied per unit gas price b c.
This price is such that the exporter’s revenue minus the supply cost equals his share
of the total surplus:
q
∗
f (b c − c) = φe
If no investment in local technology took place (K = 0), electricity production is
only based on gas and the surplus ν (N) is shared equally. The price per unit of
gas equals b cK=0 = ( ¯ P + c)/2. There is mutual dependence since the exporter needs
the access to the market but on the other hand, the importer depends on resource
imports. However, if the cost of the local technology is low (r + 2k < ¯ P), it makes
11sense to invest in this technology even though it will not be used since c < r. The
price per unit of gas is lower than in the previous case (b cK=Q = (r +c)/2) since the
importer can threat to fall back on his own capacity, which seems to be overbuilt
and underused. The importer will be completely independent of imports if the local
technology has a lower variable cost (c > r) and if the total cost is relatively low
(r + k <

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Figure 2: The gas price when the marginal gas supply cost is constant
The next section looks at the non-linear case where the supply cost C(qf) is a
convex function.
6 The non-linear case
We assume that the total supply cost of gas is convex, i.e. C(qf) = cq2
f. Since we
consider at the moment only the problem of the importer, without any government
intervention, the environmental damage is not considered yet in the optimal decision
of the importer.
6.1 The bargaining period







that maximizes the joint surplus for a given capacity K. The optimal
production mix depends on a critical capacity limit ¯ K (see Appendix) and is as
follows:











= (K,Q − K) (12)













¯ K,Q − ¯ K

(13)
This situation is represented in the ﬁgure below. The gas technology is used as
long as its marginal production cost 2cqf is lower than the marginal production cost
12of the local technology r. The critical capacity limit ¯ K is obtained by equalizing
marginal production costs of both technologies: 2c(Q − ¯ K) = r.
q
P






Figure 3: The optimal production mix
Note that the stand-alone values υ ({e}) and υ ({i}) are derived in the same way
as in the linear case before.
6.2 The investment period
The importer knows that the capacity will be fully used as long as it remains below
the threshold ¯ K. Capacity above this threshold will not be used for producing
electricity but it may be useful to improve the bargaining position of the importer.
We consider these cases below.
Case 1: The local capacity is binding (K ≤¯ K ).
The maximization problem reads
max
K [φi (K) − kK]. (14)





























The eﬀect on the importer’s surplus of an additional unit of capacity is






















¯ P − r

− k
13As long as the capacity is below the critical threshold ¯ K, producing with the local
technology is cheaper. Hence, investing in one additional unit of capacity reduces
total production costs and increases the joint surplus by 2c(Q − K) − r. Besides
an increase of the joint surplus, it also directly increases the importer’s Shapley
value by

¯ P − r

/2. The investment cost of an additional unit of capacity equals k.
The optimal investment decision depends on the relative importance of these three
eﬀects:
r + 2k > ¯ P ⇒ K










≤ ¯ K (15)
r + 2k ≤ ¯ P ⇒ K
∗ = ¯ K (16)
The situation described by (15) (resp. (16)) is referred to as the „high-cost technol-
ogy” (resp. „low-cost technology”).
Case 2: The local capacity is not binding (K >¯ K). The importer has the
objective
max
K [φi(K) − kK]
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Investing in local technology capacity has two eﬀects:



















¯ P − r

− k.
The investment no longer increases the joint surplus but the importer can still
improve his outside option. Whether he invests more than the critical threshold ¯ K
depends on the cost of the local technology and the electricity price consumers are
willing to pay:
r + 2k > ¯ P ⇒ K
∗ = ¯ K (17)
r + 2k ≤ ¯ P ⇒ K
∗ = Q (18)
14Combining the results in (15) to (18), we conclude that if the local technology
is high-cost, the importer invests K∗
1 = ¯ K +
¯ P−r−2k
2c < ¯ K in this technology and
the capacity is fully used.6 Some electricity is produced with the gas technology:
q∗
f = Q − K∗. If, however, the local technology is low-cost, the importer invests
K∗
2 = Q in renewable energy technology. In this case, electricity is produced with
both technologies and some of the local capacity is unused: q∗
l = ¯ K and q∗
f = Q− ¯ K.
These results are summarized in Figure 4. The vertical axis on the right-hand
side gives the proﬁt of the importer, i.e. the bargaining surplus minus the investment
cost. The horizontal axis indicates the installed capacity of the local technology. The
left-hand vertical axis gives the capacity which is eﬀectively used to produce elec-
tricity. The dashed curves then give the importer’s proﬁt in function of the installed
capacity. If technology is low-cost, the importer’s proﬁt function is monotonously
increasing and the importer maximizes his total proﬁt by installing a capacity equal
to Q (corner solution for investment). By contrast, if technology is high-cost, the
maximum is achieved for a capacity below the critical threshold ¯ K (interior solution
for investment). The bold continuous line shows that a capacity below ¯ K is always
fully used (see 45° line) while the capacity exceeding ¯ K is not used to produce elec-
tricity, independent of whether the technology is high-cost or low-cost. The capacity
exceeding ¯ K only has a strategic value.
Note that while we call a technology „low-cost”, the importer’s proﬁt φi (K)−kK
is not necessarily higher than in the „high-cost” situation (in the ﬁgure below, the
proﬁt is higher in the low-cost case). The distinction refers to the relationship
between variable and ﬁxed costs and it deﬁnes the optimal investment and the
optimal generation mix. Below, we give a very rough idea of „local” technologies in
which it is more interesting for an importer to invest.
6For K∗
1 > 0, it is required that 2(r + k) < ¯ P + 2cQ. Otherwise, K∗
1 = 0.
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Figure 4: The optimal investment decision
6.3 Summing up
The main results of the linear case carry over to the situation with increasing
marginal supply costs. For a costly local technology, only some investment is real-
ized and this capacity is fully used (interior solution, see Figure 4 above). For the
remaining electricity demand that cannot be satisﬁed with the local capacity, the
surplus is shared equally between the importer and the exporter given their mutual
dependence. For a relatively cheap technology, some capacity remains unused, but
it is not useless since it enables the importer to obtain lower gas prices.
The price per unit of gas decreases the more the importer invests in local capacity,
independent of whether the local technology is high- or low-cost. If the capacity is
small (K ≤ ¯ K), the gas price equals
b cK ≤ ¯ K = (c(Q − K) + ¯ P)/2
= (average supply cost +mean revenue)/2
while for a large capacity (K > ¯ K), the gas price is
b cK> ¯ K = (c

Q − ¯ K

+ α ¯ P + βr)/2
16where 0 ≤ α =
Q−K
Q− ¯ K ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β = K− ¯ K
Q− ¯ K ≤ 1. Both b cK ≤ ¯ K and b cK> ¯ K are
decreasing in K and this decrease is monotonous over the interval [0,Q]. Again, a
lower gas price has to be compared with the variable cost of the local technology that
replaces gas capacity (for K ≤ ¯ K) and with the investment cost of an additional
unit of local capacity (∀K ∈ [0,Q]).
Finally, technologies likely to be used as a threat are those which satisfy 2k+r <
¯ P (low-cost technologies), i.e. technologies with a relatively low investment cost
compared to the variable cost. Therefore, we expect that coal is more likely to
remain partly unused rather than nuclear or wind technology.
6.4 Numerical illustration
Table (1) gives the total cost, i.e. the investment cost per MWh and the fuel cost
per MWh, for various local technologies.7 For a willingness to pay ¯ P of about
70EUR/MWh, coal and nuclear are low-cost technologies while wind power is a
high-cost technology according to our model. Therefore, we expect that if there
is investment in coal- or nuclear-ﬁred capacity, there will be more capacity than
what is used to produce electricity, while wind power capacity will be used as much
as possible. We also report CO2 emissions, even though the importer does not
take them into account. Emission rates are as follows: ef = egas = 0.36t/MWh,
el = enuclear = ewind = 0t/MWh and el = ecoal = 0.86t/MWh (IEA, 2005).
7The cost data is based on IEA (2005). The data covers plants under construction or planned
and that could be commissioned between 2010 and 2015 in the countries participating in the study
(18 OECD and 3 non-OECD countries). Costs are reported in July 2003 Euro and discounted to
January 2010. The values we report in the illustration are representative. Regarding the investment
cost k, a lifetime of 40 years is assumed for coal and nuclear technology. The lifetime of wind power
is assumed to be 20 years. A discount rate of 10% was applied. Note that the investment cost
takes the technical availability of the technologies into account. For coal and nuclear capacity, an
availability of 85% is assumed while for (onshore) wind power, the availability ranges between 17
and 38%. The capacity is therefore expressed in eﬀective MW, as if the availability equals 100%.
Since availability is below 100%, the installed capacity is higher. We omit O&M costs.
17EUR/MWh coal nuclear wind
investment cost k 20 30 65
variable cost r 18 4 0
r + 2k 58 64 130
technology type for ¯ P = 70 „low-cost” „low-cost” „high-cost”
critical capacity ¯ K 279570MW 314570MW 324570MW
investment K∗ Q Q 174570
importer’s payoﬀ φi (K) − kK∗ 10.59×106Euro 11.7×106Euro 3.87×106Euro
import dependence qf/Q 13% 3% 46%
negotiated gas price ˆ c 13,5 3 50
CO2 emissions 256630tCO2 3600tCO2 54000tCO2
Table 1: total cost of local technologies
Cost data based on IEA (2005).
We also try to know in which of the three main local technologies (coal, nuclear
or wind) the importer will invest. As we mentioned earlier, a low-cost technology
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Figure 5: Variable cost and critical capacity
We apply our simpliﬁed model to the European (EU27) electricity market and
set Q = 324570MWh per hour8 and c = 0.0002 (arbitrary choice). As mentioned
earlier, coal and nuclear based technologies are low-cost technologies in the present
example. However, unused capacity is small since the critical capacities are fairly
high. Recall that the critical capacity is such that the marginal cost of the local
technology equals the marginal supply cost of gas. Since the variable cost of coal
8The average hourly EU27 electricity demand is based on 2007 data provided by Eurostat. This
is the most recent data available and it comprises electricity consumption from the industry, the
transport sector and households.
18and nuclear based electricity production is low, only a small fraction of demand is
satisﬁed with gas based production (see ﬁgure 5). Wind capacity has a too high
ﬁxed cost component to be used as a threat. Consequently, investment in wind
capacity is lower than in coal or nuclear capacity and it is fully used.
From the importer’s point of view, it is more interesting to invest in nuclear
technology than in coal technology, although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.9 With
nuclear capacity, the electricity demand is largely satisﬁed with production based
on local capacity. Accordingly, the import dependence is low which means that the
economy is protected against unforseen gas price shocks that might happen. CO2
emissions are low too. However, the problem of nuclear waste is not taken into
account. Investing in wind power does not seem to be an interesting option because
of its high investment cost. The importer’s payoﬀ is low and the economy remains
largely dependent on gas imports (46%), which can inherently lead to security of
supply problems. While the emission rate of wind power is zero, emissions are not
as low as with nuclear capacity as a large part of demand (46%) is satisﬁed with gas
based production.
The negotiated gas price depends on the available local capacity (see Section
6.3). The higher the investment in local capacity, the lower the gas price as average
marginal supply costs decrease. The actual share of gas in the EU27 total generation
mix is 21 percent meaning that 79 percent are satisifed with „local” capacity. If we
assume that there is only one supplier as in our model and that local capacity is
fully used, we may expect a gas price ˆ c of about 42Euro/MWh, which is close to
what we observe.
Clearly, this is only a rough idea of what can happen since in reality other aspects
play a role as well (the load duration proﬁle, availability of space, construction time,
public opposition to nuclear power or to CO2 intensive technologies, etc.).
7 Public intervention
We now consider a government that aims to improve the social welfare of the im-
porter’s country. In this paper, public intervention in the economy can be justiﬁed
for two reasons: strategic considerations and market failures. They are discussed
below.
9The proﬁtability of a technology 1 compared to a technology 2 is not only determined by the to-
tal cost ki+ri. If both technologies are low-cost, technology 1 gives a higher proﬁt than technology 2
if 8cQ









. If both technologies are high-cost, the condition be-
comes: 4[(k1 + r1) − (k2 + r2)]

(k1 + r1) + (k2 + r2) − ¯ P − 2cQ

. If technology 1 is low-cost while
technology 2 is high-cost, the condition is: 4(k2 + r2)[P − (k2 + r2)]+8cQ[(k2 + r2) − (k1 + r1)] >
¯ P2 + 8k2r2 − r2
1.
197.1 Strategic motives
Intervention may be required to shift surplus from the exporter to the importer’s
country. This is discussed hereafter.
In the context of one single importer, setting a per unit tax on gas increases
the social welfare of the importing country. We assume that the government sets
the tax τ ﬁrst, before the importer invests and bargains with the exporter. The
government’s objective is to maximize social welfare W, which is the sum of the
consumer surplus, the importer’s Shapley value minus investment costs, and tax
revenues:
Max
τ W (τ) = CS |{z}
consumer surplus












if ¯ P − r − 2k > 0 (20)
τ
∗ =
2(k + r) − ¯ P
3
if ¯ P − r − 2k ≤ 0 (21)
and is an increasing function of the cost of the local technology. Setting a tax or
investing in local capacity are thus substitutes in capturing a larger share of the
surplus ν(N). If the local technology is costly (high variable and/or ﬁxed cost), the
bargaining power of the importer is reduced and a tax compensates for this reduced
bargaining power. On the other hand, if the local technology is cheap, the importer
has a strong bargaining position and he captures already a large share of the total
surplus through investment in local capacity. However, equation (19) assumes that
1 Euro received by the importer is equivalent to 1 Euro received by the citizens of
the importing country through tax revenues. If the government puts less weight on
the importer’s payoﬀ and more on the citizens’ welfare, the optimal tax would be
higher.
To raise a tax is the only instrument that makes sense in the setting without
externalities. Imposing a minimum level of local capacity does not alter the invest-
ment since the objective of the importer (equation (14)) and of the government are
identical. Subsidizing investment, on the other hand, can change the investment
decision. If the government subsidizes investment with s per unit of capacity, the
investment condition becomes ¯ P −r−2(1 − s)k ? 0. If investment is not inﬂuenced
by the subsidy, i.e. if ¯ P − r − 2k > 0, there is a pure transfer from the taxpayers
of the importing country to the importer. If ¯ P − r − 2k < 0, the subsidy reduces
20social welfare because of an overinvestment in local capacity. The objective of the
government is
Max
s W (s) = CS |{z}
consumer surplus







= φi(K (s)) − kK (s) + sK (s) − sK (s) (23)
which is maximized by setting s = 0. The objective function is identical to the
importer’s objective function described by (8). There is thus no reason to change
investment through an investment subsidy as the importer already optimally bal-
ances higher investment costs with an improved bargaining position.
7.2 Market failures
Market failures prevent an eﬃcient resource allocation. Potential sources of market
failures include market power and externalities. A ﬁrm with market power typically
sets a quantity such that the price is above the marginal cost, which is ineﬃcient. In
our setting with a monopolistic electricity supplier, output is not withheld because
of a constant demand with a maximum willingness to pay. The market failure we
consider in this section is the externality implied by harmful CO2 emissions.10
7.2.1 A negative externality: CO2 emissions
In the absence of any public intervention, the environmental damage caused by
production-related emissions is not taken into account by the source of pollution
and therefore represents a negative externality. This is not diﬀerent in our setting.
The importer invests in local technologies to improve his bargaining power, while
he ignores the environmental damage. Therefore, considering social welfare of the
10Note that we consider only distortions within the importing country. However, we can easily
check that investment decisions are sub-optimal from a global welfare point of view, i.e. when the
welfare of the importing and the exporting country are considered together. In the ideal situation,
the importer and the exporter choose the technology mix so as to maximize their joint surplus.
Hence, there is no strategic reason to invest in local technologies. In particular, capacity never
remains unused. If we consider the case of convex costs, the maximization problem would be
Max
K
 ¯ PQ − c(Q − K)2 − rK − kK

(24)
and the optimal capacity not considering the environmental damage is equal to




which is lower than the optimal capacity levels when strategic considerations are taken into account
(as long as ¯ P > r+k). Strategic considerations lead to an overinvestment in local technology from
a global welfare point of view.
21importing country, we expect that investment in local technologies is suboptimal
and public intervention is needed.11 We assume that the exporter places the respon-
sibility for environmental protection on the importer’s country where pollution takes
place. This is a realistic assumption since as long as the resource is only traded, no
pollution takes place.12
7.2.2 Comparing instruments
Let the government of the importing country be a strategic player, who maximizes
the social surplus W, including the consumer surplus and the proﬁt of the importer.
We assume that the government takes the environmental damage originating from
emissions E into account. The emissions are assumed to be proportional to the
amount of electricity produced with each technology, i.e. E = efqf + elql. The
environmental damage is a linear function of emissions: D(E) = γE. Obviously,
the emission rates e are technology dependent. If the resource to be imported is gas,
then ef > el if the local resource is wind or nuclear energy. On the other hand, if
we consider coal as a local resource, then ef < el.
We restrict our analysis to two instruments: a tax on emissions and a subsidy
for wind power. They cover the main policies currently applied within the European
Union: emissions are taxed through the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and RES technologies are locally supported through feed-
in tariﬀs or green certiﬁcates systems. The timing goes as follows: the government
moves ﬁrst and sets an emission tax τ or a wind power subsidy s to maximize
the social welfare of the importing country. Then, for a given policy choice, the
importer invests in local capacity and thereafter negotiates a supply contract with
the exporter. The game is solved backwards.
The government not only takes the environmental damage, but also the eﬀect
on the importer’s bargaining position into account. The government’s objective is:
Max
τ W (τ) = CS |{z}
consumer surplus










if the policy is taxing emissions and
11Investment in local technology is expected to be too high compared to the socially optimal
level if, instead of wind or nuclear technologies, we consider coal-ﬁred capacity, of which emission
level per unit of electricity produced is higher compared to gas-ﬁred capacity. Considering nuclear
energy as an alternative, the problem of nuclear waste should be taken into account.
12Under the Kyoto protocol, for instance, industrialized countries agreed upon reducing their
emissions on average by 5.2 percent between 2008-2012 with respect to the emission level of 1990.
22Max
s W (s) = CS |{z}
consumer surplus










if wind power is subsidized.
Recall that in our setting, the consumer surplus is always zero since the importer
sets the proﬁt maximizing price for electricity, i.e. P = ¯ P. Comparing analytically
the diﬀerent instruments and technologies is not straightforward. Therefore, we
limit the comparison to a numerical illustration.
7.2.3 Numerical illustration
We take the same parameter assumptions as in Section 6.4. The constant marginal
environmental damage is set to γ = 20EUR/tCO2 (European Commission, 1999).
Results are reported in the table below.13 We also indicate whether outcomes in-
crease (↑) or decrease (↓) with respect to the situation without government inter-
vention and without damage implied by CO2 emissions (Table 1).
policy tax on emissions subsidy
local technology coal nuclear wind wind
optimal policy τ∗=33.7EUR/tCO2 τ∗=11.1EUR/tCO2 τ∗=68.8EUR/tCO2 s∗=7.2EUR/qwind
social welfare W 5.38×106Euro(↓) 11.68×106Euro(↓) 3.94×106Euro(↑) 2.92×106Euro(↓)
import dependence qf/Q 40%(↑) 0%(↓) 25%(↓) 35%(↓)
CO2 emissions 214340tCO2(−16%) 0tCO2(−100%) 31708tCO2(−41%) 41040tCO2(−24%)
Table 2: The optimal policy
What we learn from this simple numerical illustration is the following: ﬁrstly,
coal capacity turns out to be much less attractive than in the setting without envi-
ronmental damage (see Table 1) as its CO2 intensity is high. Social welfare decreases
sharply and the economy becomes more vulnerable because of an increased import
dependence. Thus there is a trade-oﬀ between security of supply on the one hand,
and lower CO2 emissions on the other hand. Nevertheless, as regards social wel-
fare, investing in coal capacity still remains more interesting than investing in wind
power. Secondly, in a ﬁrst best setting, the optimal tax τ∗ should be equal to the
marginal environmental damage γ. In our model we observe that the optimal tax is
above the marginal damage. This is because the tax is not only designed to reduce
emissions but also to capture part of the surplus which would otherwise go to the
13Finding the optimal solutions is not straigthforward. The full computations can be obtained
from the author.
23exporter (see equations (20) and (21)). This leads us to the third conclusion related
to the question whether one should rather tax emissions or subsidize renewables.
Taxing emissions is preferred as a tax not only reduces emissions but also captures
part of the surplus that would otherwise go to the exporter (in our example, the
tax revenue eﬀect even outweighs the negative eﬀect of CO2 emissions as social
welfare increases). Subsidizing wind capacity, on the other hand, reduces emissions
but does not generate any additional revenue for the importing country. It can be
shown that the entire subsidy expenditure is received by the importer. This last
fact might also be a reason why we observe that in reality, renewable energy is often
subsidized: a subsidy can be justiﬁed by technology spillover eﬀects, which we do
not consider here, but the existence of subsidies may also be the result of lobbying
by the renewable energy industry. At least within our framework, taxing emissions
is preferred from a social welfare point of view. However, the importer looses while
citizens/tax payers gain because of less emissions and tax revenues.
This section has shown that public intervention is justiﬁed for two reasons:
strategic motives and market failures. A tax on gas imports generates revenues
for the importing country. Part of these revenues would otherwise add to the ex-
porter’s payoﬀ. We have also shown that a strategic tax setting by the government
and a strategic investment in local capacity by the importer are substitutes: if the
local capacity is costly, the importer’s bargaining power is reduced but a tax com-
pensates for this reduced bargaining power. Of course, a tax on imports reduces the
importer’s payoﬀ but this reduction is more than compensated by increased tax rev-
enues for the importing country. If the government also cares about CO2 emissions,
the optimal tax is above the marginal environmental damage since the tax contains
two elements: a Pigouvian and a strategic component. Finally, while we observe in
reality that renewable energy is often subsidized, we argue that a better strategy is
to tax emissions instead: a subsidy increases the investment in wind power and thus
reduces emissions but it does not generate any additional revenue for the importing
country.
The next section extends the model to several importers and shows that another
market failure, namely positive strategic spillover eﬀects, justify public intervention.
8 More importers
This section questions whether or not investment incentives change if several im-
porters bargain with the same exporter.
We consider one exporter, denoted by e, and two importers, i1 and i2. We
24assume that importers produce and sell electricity in separated regional markets
j = 1,2, i.e. demand is independent.14 To compare with the previous setting, we
assume that demand in each region is ﬁxed and equal to Q/2 so that total demand
Q remains unchanged. We can apply this setting, for example, to the European
electricity market which is still divided into diﬀerent regional markets dominated by
a few large electricity producers.
8.1 Shapley Values
Shapley values are computed for each player h = e,i1,i2 according to (1). In the
setting of one exporter and one importer, negotiations were straightforward: either
both players cooperate or they remain alone. With three players, more cooperation
opportunities exist. As stated in Winter (2002, p.2027): „Shapley also viewed the
value as an index for measuring the power of players in a game. Like a price index
or other market indices, the value uses averages to aggregate the power of players in
their various cooperation opportunities.” The power of a player h is measured by his
marginal contribution ψh (S) to a given coalition S ⊆ N. The larger his contribution,
the more powerful he is. Table 3 presents every possible cooperation opportunity
and the correspondent marginal contribution. For instance, in the ordering e−i1−i2,
S = {e} and the exporter’s marginal contribution equals ψe ({e}) = υ(e) − υ(∅) =
υ(e), i.e. his stand-alone value. In the ordering i2 − i1 − e, S = {N}, he joins the
two importers and his marginal contribution is ψe ({N}) = υ (N) − υ (i1,i2).
ordering marg contr e marg contr i1 marg contr i2
e − i1 − i2 υ (e) υ (i1,e) − υ (e) υ (N) − υ (i1,e)
e − i2 − i1 υ (e) υ (N) − υ (i2,e) υ (i2,e) − υ (e)
i1 − i2 − e υ (N) − υ (i1,i2) υ (i1) υ (i1,i2) − υ (i1)
i1 − e − i2 υ (i1,e) − υ (i1) υ (i1) υ (N) − υ (i1,e)
i2 − i1 − e υ (N) − υ (i1,i2) υ (i1,i2) − υ (i2) υ (i2)
i2 − e − i1 υ (i2,e) − υ (i2) υ (N) − υ (i2,e) υ (i2)
Table 3: Marginal contributions in a three-player game
Assuming that the exporter’s stand-alone value υ (e) is zero and that markets
14This assumption is also used in Inderst and Wey (2001) or Ikonnikova and Zwart (2009).
25are separated, i.e. υ (i1,i2) = υ (i1) + υ (i2), the Shapley values φh equal
φe = 1














































Expressions (28) to (30) indicate that investment decisions by one importer not
only aﬀect his own bargaining power, but also the bargaining position of the other
importer.
8.2 Analysis
We consider the investment of importer 1, knowing that the problem of importer 2 is
symmetric. Importer 1’s investment aﬀects the Shapley value of importer 2 through









































If the marginal supply cost is constant (C00(qf) = 0), then the investment of one
importer has no eﬀect on the other importer’s bargaining position. A linear supply
cost C(qf) = cqf implies that local capacity is fully used in coalition S = {N} and
S = {i1,e} if r < c. If r > c, the local capacity is never used in these coalitions. In
both cases, the external eﬀect is zero:
∂φi2
∂K1 = 0. Hence, the importers’ investment
decisions are independent from each other. Nevertheless, there is still a strategic
incentive to invest in local capacity but this is exactly the same as the problem
described in Section 5. Since we are interested in interactions between investment
decisions, we therefore assume a convex supply cost C(qf) = cq2
f.












Region [2] 2c(Q−Ki1−Ki2)−r>0 0 2c(Q−Ki1−Ki2)−r>0
Region [3] 0 0 0
Table 4: Investment externalities
We notice that the external eﬀect is always positive (region [1] and [2]) or zero
(region [3]). Therefore, the investment can never hurt the other importer. However,
if importers invest to maximize their own share of the total surplus, they neglect
the eﬀect of their decision on the other importer’s bargaining position. Investment
in local capacity Kij(j = 1,2) is suboptimal and cooperation for strategic reasons
is thus required.
Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀect of importer 1’s investment in local capacity on
importer 2’s Shapley value, for a given investment Ki2. The external eﬀect is positive
and constant in region [1] while it is positive but decreasing in region [2]. For a large
capacity (region [3]), importer 1 only improves his stand-alone value υ (i1) and the
external eﬀect is zero. The same ﬁgure also shows the eﬀect of an increase of the
critical capacity ¯ K, caused by a lower variable cost r of the local technology. The
length of region[2] does not change while the length of region [1] increases and that
of region [3] decreases. Hence, for any given level of Kij(j = 1,2), the external
eﬀect becomes larger. From this we can conclude that the external eﬀect of local
technology with a low variable cost, i.e. wind power or nuclear technology, is larger






K - 2 i K K -








0 K D > 0 K D >
Figure 6: The external eﬀect of investment in local generation capacity
27The reason why importer 1 aﬀects importer 2’s bargaining power is the following:
If the marginal supply cost is increasing (C00 > 0) and if the additional capacity will
be used in the grand coalition N, importer 2 not only beneﬁts from an increased
total payoﬀ υ (N) (region [1] and [2]) but the investment also reduces total demand
for gas (q1
f + q2
f) while importer 2’s demand remains unchanged (q2
f = ¯ q2
f). Average
supply costs C(¯ q2
f)/¯ q2
f to market 2 are lower (region [1]) and the bargaining position
of importer 2 improves accordingly (see Figure 7). For local technologies with a low
variable cost r, both eﬀects are relevant and the external eﬀect is large (region [1]).
For technologies with medium variable costs, investment is likely to only change the
total payoﬀ ν (N) and the external eﬀect is postive but decreasing. For technologies
with high variable costs, region [3] is large and external eﬀects are negligible.
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Figure 7: The average supply cost to market 2
The same reasoning holds for the eﬀect of importer 1’s investment on his own
bargaining power: As long as the additional capacity is used to produce electricity,
it reduces the total and his own demand for gas. Since the supply cost of gas
is convex, the average supply cost decreases and his bargaining power increases.
Hence, the channel through which an importer obtains a better deal is a reduced
demand combined with a convex supply cost. This insight is in line with Inderst and
Wey (2007) where total demand is given and a larger ﬁrm gets a better deal as the
average supply cost to this ﬁrm is lower. Here, the ﬁrm’s size does not change while
total demand and its own demand decreases. Of course, independent of whether the
additional capacity is used or not, importer 1 also increases his bargaining power
28through a higher stand-alone value υ (i1).
9 Conclusion
We have shown that a private company invests in local technology to improve its
bargaining position with respect to a monopolistic supplier of an input such as gas.
Hence, the importer does not act as a passive price-taker since he knows that he
can get more favorable terms by improving his outside option. As a matter of fact,
the negotiated gas price is a decreasing function of the investment in local capacity.
We may even observe that there is more investment than that which is needed for
electricity production, especially if the capacity cost is relatively low. This unused
capacity only has a threatening role.
Public intervention in importing countries is justiﬁed for two reasons: strategic
motives and market failures. With a tax on gas, the government captures part of the
surplus that would otherwise go to the exporter. We have also shown that a strategic
tax setting by the government and strategic investment in local capacity by the
importer are alternative measures to get a larger part of the surplus. The cheaper
the local technology, the lower the optimal tax level. A costly local technology
reduces the importer’s bargaining power and a tax on gas imports compensates for
this reduced bargaining power. Taxing emissions is also a way to correct the negative
externality implied by harmful CO2 emissions. Therefore, the optimal tax level has
two components: a Pigouvian component and a strategic component.
The numerical illustration shows that when taxing emissions, coal capacity be-
comes much less attractive as welfare sharply decreases and the import dependence
increases. In this case, there is therefore a trade-oﬀ between environmental protec-
tion and security of supply. Investing in nuclear technology, on the other hand, is
always the best option. However, building new nuclear plants will be subject to
public opposition.
Investing in wind capacity is less attractive for the importer since the ﬁxed cost
is high. To reduce emissions, it is better to tax emissions instead of subsidizing
electricity generation based on wind capacity as the tax will capture part of the
surplus that would otherwise go to the exporter. With a subsidy, no additional
revenue is generated for the importing country.
With a model of 2 importers bargaining with the same exporter, there are positive
strategic externalities of investments in local technologies if the marginal supply
cost of gas is increasing. If every importing country only considers its own strategic
position, investment is likely to be suboptimal when considering their joint surplus.
29Externalities are more pronounced for technologies with a low variable cost. A
common European energy policy, such as setting RES targets, can therefore make
sense from a strategic point of view. If, on the other hand, we assume that the
marginal supply cost of gas is constant, there are no strategic externalities while it
can remain interesting from a strategic point of view to invest in local capacity.
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qf + ql = Q
ql ≤ K




¯ P − c

(Q − ql) +

¯ P − r

ql + λK (K − ql)
i
where λK is the multiplier associated to the restriction ql ≤ K. The optimal
solution q∗
l to this problem has to satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
1. ql ≥ 0;
2. c − r − λK ≤ 0;
3. ql(c − r − λK) = 0;
4. λK ≥ 0;
5. K − ql ≥ 0;
6. λK (K − ql) = 0.
These conditions imply two cases:
c − r > 0. The condition ql ≤ K is binding (λK > 0) and q∗
l = K. Therefore,
the capacity is fully used and q∗
f = Q − K.
32c − r ≤ 0. The condition ql ≤ K is not binding (λK = 0) and q∗
l = 0. Conse-
quently, q∗
f = Q.
Applying the Shapley value
The Shapley value allocates the surplus of the grand coalition (the set of all play-
ers) according to the average marginal contribution of every player. The average
marginal contribution of a player is obtained by considering every possible ordering
of the grand coalition and by taking the average of the marginal eﬀect a player has
by joining the coalition.
Since we have two players, there are two orderings possible: i−e and e−i. The
marginal contribution of the importer in the ﬁrst ordering is equal to υ(i) − υ(∅) =
υ(i) if we assume that the value υ(∅) of an empty set ∅ is zero. The marginal
contribution in the second ordering is (υ(N) − υ(e)). Therefore the Shapley value












[υ(i) − υ(e)]. (31)







[υ(e) − υ(i)]. (32)
Equivalence between the Shapley value and the Nash Bar-
gaining Solution
In the two-person bargaining problem of this paper, we show that the sharing of
the total surplus υ(N) implied by the Shapley value is equivalent to the sharing
described by the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950).
Both the Shapley value (SV) and the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) satisfy
the eﬃciency axiom: the players’ payoﬀs sum up to the value of the grand coalition
υ(N). Thus the sharing point lies on the eﬃcient frontier of the set of possible
outcomes S. If no agreement is reached, then every player gets the stand-alone
value. The disagreement point is therefore D = {υ (i),υ (e)} = {υ (i),0}.
The Nash Bargaining Solution implies a sharing (αi,1 − αi) of the total surplus
33υ(N) that maximizes:
[αiυ(N) − υ (i)][(1 − αi)υ(N) − 0]
where αi[0,1] is the share of the surplus υ(N) that the importer receives. The




υ(N) − (υ (e) − υ (i))
2υ(N)
In our setting, the Nash Bargaining Solution proposes a sharing equivalent to equa-
tion (31) and (32). Note that the importer’s investment in local technology aﬀects
υ (N), the disagreement point D and, therefore, the set of possible outcomes S.
Improving the outside option υ (i) increases the importer’s bargaining power and,
hence, his share of the total surplus (dα∗
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Figure 8: The Shapley Value and the Nash Bargaining Solution











qf + ql = Q
ql ≤ K




¯ PQ − rql − c(Q − ql)
2 + λK (K − ql)
i
where λK is the multiplier associated to the restriction ql ≤ K. The optimal
solution q∗
l to this problem has to satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
1. ql ≥ 0;
2. −r + 2c(Q − ql) − λK ≤ 0;
3. ql (−r + 2c(Q − ql) − λK) = 0;
4. λK ≥ 0;
5. (K − ql) ≥ 0;
6. λK (K − ql) = 0.
Not surprisingly, q∗
l depends on the available capacity K. We distinguish two cases:
if K ≤ Q − r
2c = ¯ K, then q∗
l = K (the capacity constraint is binding, λK > 0)
and q∗
f = Q − K.
if K > Q − r
2c = ¯ K, then q∗
l = ¯ K.
Two importers
This section analyzes the eﬀect of the investment of importer 1 on the payoﬀ of the
grand coalition, υ (N), and the payoﬀ υ (i1,e). The combined eﬀect also determines
the eﬀect of importer 1’s investment on importer 2’s Shapley value (equation 30).
Note that the eﬀect on the stand-alone value υ (i1) is positive as long as Ki1 ≤ Q/2
and Ki1 will never exceed the size of the market Q/2 as it has no eﬀect on the
Shapley value φi1. We assume the supply cost to be convex, C(qf) = cq2
f.
Eﬀect on υ (N)
Importer 1’s investment has no eﬀect on the payoﬀ of the grand coalition if Ki1 +
Ki2 > ¯ K = Q − r/2c. The surplus cannot be increased since the supply cost of an
additional unit of gas is lower than the variable cost of the local capacity if Ki1+Ki2
exceeds the critical capacity ¯ K: 2cqf < r. Accordingly, the eﬀect will be positive if
35Ki1 + Ki2 < ¯ K since the variable cost r is lower than the marginal supply cost of
gas, 2cqf.
Eﬀect on υ (i1,e)
The investment of importer 1 will not anymore increase the payoﬀ of the coalition
S = {i1,e} if the marginal supply cost of gas is lower than the variable cost of the
local capacity, i.e. if Ki1 > ¯ K − Q/2. This implies that the eﬀect is zero as long as
the critical capacity is small, i.e. if ¯ K < Q/2.
The table below presents the impacts that the investment of importer 1 may






∂Ki1 = 0 ¯ K < Ki1 + Ki2 impossible
∂υ(N)
∂Ki1 > 0 Ki1 + Ki2 < ¯ K < Ki1 + Q/2 ¯ K > Ki1 + Q/2
Depending on the eﬀect of the investment Ki1on υ (N) and υ (i1,e), we deﬁne 3
regions:
1. Ki1 ≤ ¯ K − Q/2:
∂υ(N)
∂Ki1 > 0 and
∂υ(i1,e)
∂Ki1 > 0
2. ¯ K − Q/2 < Ki1 < ¯ K − Ki2:
∂υ(N)
∂Ki1 > 0 and
∂υ(i1,e)
∂Ki1 = 0
3. Ki1 ≥ ¯ K − Ki2:
∂υ(N)
∂Ki1 = 0 and
∂υ(i1,e)
∂Ki1 = 0
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